We investigate the drivers of systemic risk and contagion among European banks from 2007 to 2012. First, we derive a systemic risk measure from the concepts of MES and CoVaR analysing tail co-movements of daily bank stock returns. We then run panel regressions for our systemic risk measure using idiosyncratic bank characteristics and a set of country and policy control variables. Our results comprise highly significant drivers of systemic risk in the European banking sector with important implications for banking regulation.
Introduction
Which factors determine the systemic importance of European banks? With the most recent financial crises, interest in the concept of systemic risk has grown. In this paper, we investigate the drivers of systemic risk 1 in the European financial sector as well as contagion 2 among banks. To this end, we propose a novel measure of systemic risk -the Systemic Risk Index (SRI) -to capture the impact a single financial institution has on the financial sector and vice versa. The topic of our paper is f considerable interest for regulators and economists, because our results offer new insights into the drivers of financial instability and provide implications for the macroprudential regulation of banks.
Financial systems as a whole tend toward instability. This is due to the fragile nature of their players, especially banks. Because of their role as a financial intermediary (or delegated monitor), their opaqueness, their interconnectedness, and the typical characteristics of their lenders, banks are particularly prone to infecting other banks with financial distress -or to being infected by them. This in particular holds for those banks that almost certainly and rather quickly could destabilise the system as a whole: so-called systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). Consequently, the identification of drivers of systemically important banks (SIBs) is of vital importance. Recent papers on systemic risk of banks produced substantial findings. Existing literature in this field, however, is comparably young and leaves questions unanswered: (1) First, it is unclear how to identify systemically important banks. (2) Second, there is no consensus on how to measure their potential negative 1 Systemic risk is the risk "that cumulative losses will accrue from an event that sets in motion a series of successive losses along a chain of institutions or markets comprising a system… That is, systemic risk is the risk of a chain reaction of falling interconnected dominoes" ( Kaufman, 1995) . Essentially, we follow this idea by measuring the contagion from banks to the financial system and vice versa. The European Systemic Risk Board/European Commission (2010) defines systemic risk as the risk of disruption in the financial system with the potential to have serious negative consequences for the internal market and the real economy. Similarly to this idea, Acharya et al. (2011) and Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) quantify systemic risk by measuring a bank's (risk) contribution to the overall financial system. For a list of further possible definitions of systemic risk in the literature, see Prokopczuk (2009) . 2 Banking contagion, concentrating on the transmission of a bank shock to other banks or the financial system, lies at the heart of systemic risk. Long before the recent financial crises, Bagehot (1873) diagnoses as follows: "In wild periods of alarm, one failure makes many, and the best way to prevent the derivative failures is to arrest the primary failure which causes them".
impact on the system. (3) Third, it is unknown which macroprudential regulations for systemically important banks are most effective without hampering free market forces. We contribute to the closing of the research gaps by using innovative key indicators for systemic risk. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows:
Section 2 offers a review of related literature on systemic risk (of European banks) as our background and starting point. The subsequent section 3 explains our sample selection.
Section 4 depicts the design of our research. The presentation of our results follows in section 5, while section 6 concludes our findings.
Related literature
In this section, we briefly discuss the related theoretical and empirical literature on drivers of systemic risk in the European banking sector.
The first step for the identification of drivers of systemic risk is the assessment of systemic risk levels. The number of measures for systemic risk has grown rapidly in recent years 3 . The literature can be divided into the streams of (1) systemic risk contribution and (2) systemic risk sensitivity (see e.g. Prokopczuk, 2009 ) as illustrated in Figure 1 . Approaches for systemic risk contribution try to determine systemic importance by measuring a single institution's contribution to systemic risk. Those measures assess how one institution affects others.
According to this understanding, it is of particular interest to avoid and mitigate contagion effects. Conversely designed measures dealing with the (2) systemic risk sensitivity try to determine systemic importance by measuring the extent to which a single institution is affected in the case of a systemic event. The overall functioning of the financial system and individual institutional resilience is the focus of this approach. Table 1 summarises a selection of popular systemic risk measures for financial institutions from both streams. Considering both approaches, we combine a measure for systemic risk contribution (related to ΔCoVar by 3 Bisias et al. (2012) provide a survey of systemic risk measures. Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011) and a measure for the systemic risk sensitivity (related to MES by Acharya et al., 2011) based on banks' stock returns as presented in section 4.1. 
Figure 1. Systemic risk contribution and sensitivity

Systemic risk sensitivity
To what extent is a single institution affected by systemic risk?
ΔCoVar captures the marginal contribution of a particular institution (in a non-causal sense) to the overall systemic risk by applying quantile regressions (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011) Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) determines the level of systemic risk by measuring an institution's losses (in terms of negative index returns) when the (financial) system as a whole is doing poorly (Acharya et al., 2011) Co-Risk analyses the tails of the default distributions for pairs of institutions, or − to put it simply − it analyses how the default risk of an institution affects the default risk of another institution (Chan-Lau, 2010) SRISK is an index formed by the leverage, size and the MES of a firm (Brownlees and Engle, 2012) Granger Causality measures the directionality of relationships or causality of price movements of securities issued by financial institutions (Billio et al., 2012) Lower Tail  Dependence  (LTD) is a measure of the propensity of a single financial institution to experience joint extreme adverse effects (measured in price returns) with the market (Weiß et al., 2014 )
is a technique to decompose asset returns of a sample of financial institutions into linkages between those institutions (León and Murcia, 2013) Contingent Claims Analysis (CCA) measures systemic solvency risk based on market-implied expected losses of financial institutions by generating aggregate estimates of the joint default risk of multiple institutions as a conditional tail expectation (Jobst and Gray, 2013) This table summarises a selection of common systemic risk measures for financial institutions from the systemic risk sensitivity and systemic risk contribution streams.
analysis, Vallascas and Keasey (2012) find several key drivers of systemic risk of European banks like high leverage, low liquidity, size, and high non-interest income. Using a comparable methodology, Varotto and Zhao (2014) confirm the positive impact of size and leverage on systemic risk for a set of European banks. Black et al. (2013) propose a sensitivity-related risk measure for systemic risk, and find significant correlations with accounting-and market-based bank-specific measures of European banks: They confirm that systemic risk increases with bank size. Interestingly, they also find that European banks with a more traditional lending business and more liquid assets are less likely to increase systemic risk. Lastly, they find that bank profitability has no impact on systemic risk, and that the market-to-book ratio has an influence on banks' systemic risk in Europe that can be either positive or negative.
Sample selection
We start by selecting a representative sample of European banks. Table 2 ). Our sample includes 14 of the 24 European banks that failed the EBA stress test at the end of Oct. 2014 (see European Banking Authority, 2014 and Appendix Table 6 ). The full bank sample as a balanced panel with 294 observations is used for robustness checks (Appendix Table 3 ). The table presents the distribution of European banks we analyse in our sample. The distribution per country is reported in Appendix Table 5 .
Appendix Table 6 provides the names of all banks included in the sample.
Research design
To measure systemic risk in the European banking system, we combine the contribution and sensitivity approach used by recent literature (Guerra et al., 2013; Bongini and Nieri, 2014) 7 and propose a new risk measure, the systemic risk index (SRI), to capture both equally. From the point of view of the method of first measuring the systemic risk of a bank, our paper is most closely related to Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and Acharya et al. (2011) . Second, to analyse determinants on systemic risks, we make use of the approaches elaborated by Acharya and Steffen (2014) and Weiß et al. (2014) . 6 We manually check missing accounting values, finding and adding most of them. In some cases, however, we do not find the necessary data, which may bias our results since balance sheet composition may affect the bank opacity, see Flannery et al. (2013) . In a recent paper on bank opaqueness, Mendonça et al. (2013) find that a decrease in bank opaqueness fosters an environment favourable to the development of a sound banking system and the avoidance of financial crises. 4.1 Systemic Risk Index -measuring system risk When the banking system is in distress, losses and liquidity shortages spread from one bank to others, finally affecting the system as a whole (Hauptmann and Zagst 2011) . To analyse the role of a single bank in closely knit and, thus, contagious networks, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) propose the , which is the value at risk ( ) of the banking system conditional on an institution being in distress. The follows the systemic risk contribution approach: It is meant to capture the bank-specific potential for spreading financial distress from a single institution i across the banking system Sys by gauging the tail co-movement of the financial system with the institution's stock (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011) . The , however, does not satisfactorily capture the tail co-movement of the banking system and a single bank, since it ignores observed values within the tail. By the systemic risk contribution --we denote the average return of a banking system relative to an institution return conditional on the institution's return being below its value at risk � �:
with denoting the return of the banking system. This criticism is similar to the general criticism of the .
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Theoretically, r i could be equal to zero and, for that case, formula (1) would not work. This case is, however, hardly possible in practice as an average of the worst stock return observations is unlikely to be zero.
Generally defined, the measures the reaction of the banking system at the q% worst days of a certain bank's stocks within one year. 10 . In other words, an 5% of 0.5 would mean that the average return of the banking system would be positively associated with a coefficient of 0.5 with an institution's stock returns , when the respective institution's losses exceeds their limit.To put it simply: When the institution's stocks decline by e.g. 6% on average during the worst 5% of days within one year, we expect the banking system's stocks to decline by 3% on those days.
The (systemic risk sensitivity) measure follows the systemic risk sensitivity approach: It captures the banking systems' return when a single institution i is in distress. The SRS we propose is very closely related to the marginal expected shortfall ( ) employed by Acharya et al. (2011) . Instead of measuring absolute values, we put the banking system's losses in relation to the institution's losses. Finally, since we use average values we improve the explanatory power of the by better capturing the tail co-movement of a single institution and the banking system. Analogously to , we denote by systemic risk sensitivity, , the average return of a bank relative to a banking system return conditional on the banking system's return falling below its value at risk � � 11 P:
An 5% of 0.5 would mean that the respective institution's mean stock return would be positively associated with the banking system's return , with a coefficient of 0.5 when the banking system's losses exceed their limit. In other words, when the banking system's stocks decline by, e.g. 6% on average during the worst 5% of days within one year, we would expect the institution's stocks to decline by 3% on those days.
10
We derived the SRC from the CoVaR measure proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) .
11
We derive the SRS from the MES measure proposed by Acharya et al. (2011) .
At the final stage, we average the and to obtain our systemic risk index for financial institutions, which considers both directions of risk transmission and contagion equally 12 :
For the remainder of the paper, for q we will use the 5% quantile and simplify the notation to . The systemic risk index is a good convention for approximating the practical requirements of regulators and theoretical models on the systemic importance of financial institutions. It demonstrates both how a single bank affects the financial system and how it can be affected by that system. Furthermore, is based on well-known statistical measures of risk, and the results -expressed in natural units -allow for an interpretation from an economic point of view. To demonstrate that the value at risk is not equal to our systemic risk index, we plot (with reverse signs) against the for our sample of European banks (see Figure 2 ): It illustrates that there is only a very weak link between the individual (idiosyncratic) risk of the institutions we analyse, measured by (abscissa), and the institutions' systemic risk, measured by (ordinate). There is only a weak, statistically insignificant correlation between the and of -0.0322 (p-value <0.583). The observed is also more stable since its mean coefficient of variation (0.201) is lower than in the case of the (0.380). Finally, the issue of choosing an appropriate index for calculating our SRI measure is not trivial (Benoit, 2014) . As our aim is to estimate systemic risk in the European financial sector, we use the MSCI Europe Financials Index. This valueweighted equity index captures around 100 large and mid-cap entities across 15 countries in
Europe from the banking, financial services, insurance, and real estate sectors. 13 We provide a robustness check for our results using the EU Datastream Banks Index (Appendix Table 4 ).
Figure 2. VaR of banks' stock returns (in %)
and SRIs (2007 SRIs ( -2012 .
The figure presents a comparison of the value at risk (VaR) and the systemic risk index (SRI)
for the sample of European banks.
Bank characteristics as determinants of systemic risk
The purpose of our study is to identify sources for systemic risk of banks in Europe. With this paper, we investigate the extent to which panel regressions could explain why some banks have a higher influence on financial market stability than others. 14 With this objective in mind,
we collect a dataset on idiosyncratic bank characteristics as well as information concerning countries' regulatory environments and macroeconomic conditions. The data on banks' cash flows, balance sheets, and profit or loss statements is obtained from Thomson Reuters
Worldscope (for a full variable definition, see Appendix Table 1 ). Where available, we fill data gaps manually with data from banks' websites.
13
The MSCI Europe Financials Index (Datastream code: M1URFNE) offers the best available coverage for the European financial sector. We also create our own indices by value weighting the stock returns of all banks in our samples (as proposed by e.g. Weiß et al., 2014) , leading to the same core results for our regression. However, as we are more interested in analysing the determinants for systemic risk in the European financial sector as a whole, those results are not presented in this paper. 
SRI
VaR of banks' stock returns (%)
Our first explanatory variable is SIZE, which is defined as the decimal logarithm of a bank's total assets. Large banks may be better diversified and carry less individual (idiosyncratic) risk. However, large banks are more closely connected to and within the financial system through interbank liabilities and other exposures to the financial system, making them particularly hard to replace (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2013) 15 . Additionally, banks deemed "too big to fail" are thought to receive implicit state guarantees, so that subsequent bailout expectations increase the risk appetite of banks enjoying this governmental support, as protected actors feel less incentivised to apply market discipline (Gropp et al., 2014; . Therefore, we expect bank size to have a positive influence on systemic risk.
To describe the type of business a bank is mainly engaged in on the asset side and the level of revenue diversification, we obtain data on banks' share of total loans to total assets (LOAN) -loan ratio -and the share of non-interest income to total income (NON_INT). Although employing different approaches, both are indicators for the banks' dependency on -riskiernon-commercial-banking activities such as investment banking or trading. In contrast, it is also argued and empirically supported in the literature that low ratios of total loans to total assets and relatively high non-interest incomes are an indicator of innovative business models, better diversification and, as a consequence, lower systemic risk exposures (see e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2007; Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; Morgan and Stiroh, 2005) . However, for the case of small banks in countries with more private/asymmetric information, De Jonghe et al.
(2014) show that the "bright side of innovation" disappears -a situation that is less likely in Europe. Consequently, from literature we cannot derive a clear hypothesis of the impact of LOAN and NON_INT on systemic risk. To control for the influence of a bank's loan portfolio quality (credit risk), we use NON_PERF -the share of loan loss provisions to the total book value of loans -as an explanatory variable in our regression. We assume that NON_PERF captures the risk level of a bank's loan portfolio, and we expect banks with riskier loan portfolios to affect the financial system more negatively than others.
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The BCBS uses exposures (a method comparable to our SIZE) as an indicator of systemic importance.
In order to measure the influence of banks' capital structure, we include LEVERAGE and DEPOSIT in our regression. For LEVERAGE, i.e. the ratio of debt to equity, we expect a clear positive relationship with the systemic risk a bank poses on the financial system, because higher leverage means higher default risks due to a smaller cushion that could absorb losses, as well as a higher ratio of fixed expenses. As a proxy for the banks' liability portfolio and business type, we utilise DEPOSIT, i.e. the ratio of total deposits to total liabilities.
Traditional commercial banks with a focus on non-securitised savings and loan business usually have high deposit ratios. In particular, banks with high deposit ratios are financed less via securities or by the capital market in general. Therefore, they are less connected to other banks or other institutional investors. For these reasons, we expect DEPOSIT to have a negative influence on banks' systemic risk.
A further variable we use is the regulatory measure TIER1 ratio (or Basel core capital ratio), which is the ratio of core equity capital to total risk-weighted assets, measuring the capacity of loss absorption. According to bank regulators, a high TIER1 ratio indicates that the bank is in a solid state. In this scenario, we would expect a negative impact on a bank's systemic risk.
On the contrary, banks that are forced to have a higher regulatory coverage ratio may also be incentivised to take even more risk, because they do not internalise the negative realisations of tail risk projects (Perotti et al., 2011) .
Another bank-specific variable we consider for our panel regression is LIQUIDITY (the ratio of cash and tradable securities to total deposits). A large portion of cash and security reserves is probably advantageous at times of negative shocks in the financial system, when interbank markets easily dry out and liquidity becomes scarce (e.g. Brunnermeier, 2009 ). According to this account, LIQUIDITY is expected to decrease systemic risk. FIN_POW, the ratio of net cash flow of operating activities to total liabilities, is also a proxy for liquidity risks and indicates the time banks need to settle their total liabilities with their operating cash flow.
Similarly to LIQUIDITY, we expect a negative influence on systemic risk.
Next, we control for the influence of banks' profitability on systemic risk by employing the operating profit margin -OP_MARG -(the ratio of operating income to net sales) and the rather capital-oriented return on invested capital (ROIC). In principle, as Weiß et al. (2014) argue, both measures could be coincident with stability or risk: High values of OP_MARG or ROIC could shield from the risk of defaulting, so that those banks could be a pillar of stability. Higher profitability, on the other hand, could also be the result of extended yet successful engagement in risky lending/non-lending activities, which may suddenly cause or contribute to the bank's -as well as general systemic -instability. Therefore, we expect an undirected effect on systemic risk. The same is true for INCOME, the annual growth of income (mainly consisting of interest and fees -for a full variable definition, see Appendix Table 1 ). We consider it a good proxy for bank activity growth, since it is comparatively less vulnerable to accounting manipulations.
Next, we employ the ratio of the market capitalisation to the book value of the bank's common equity: market-to-book ratio -MBR. A high MBR can be an indicator of disproportionately high expectations for earnings prospects on the side of investors. High earning prospects are normally associated with higher risks. In most cases, this development is intensified by bank managers ("empire building"), since they are incentivised toward excessive risk taking in order to increase firm value to form a "glamour bank", as Weiß et al. (2014) argue. Following a different line of thought, Demsetz et al. (1996) argue that a high market-to-book ratio helps to reduce excessive risk taking, because banks have a great deal to lose if a risky business strategy leads to insolvency. However, this may not or may less strongly apply to banks deemed "too big to fail" due to their increased appetite for risk.
Overall, we expect the MBR ratio to affect systemic risk, even though the direction is indecisive. The last bank-specific variable we consider is the banks' long-term rating (LTR).
Due to data gaps in bank rating histories, we first collect the long-term ratings from Moody's and fill missing values with hand-collected rating data from S&P's and Fitch. We use an 18-notch rating scale. For numerical reasons, values from 0 to 1 in steps of
are assigned, with 0 denoting AAA (the highest rating) and 1 denoting D (default) 16 . The mean LTR value of 0.276 in Table 3 therefore indicates the relatively high mean rating of A for the banks in the sample. We expect (the assessment of) individual banks' default probability to have an increasing effect on systemic risk, and so LTR should positively affect systemic risk. Eurostat databases (Appendix Table 1 provides detailed definitions and data sources).
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The ratings transition matrix is provided in Table 7 . would expect high banking concentration to increase stability. However, there are also theoretical justifications and relevant empirical indications that defend the opposing view of fragility increasing with concentration, such as e.g. Beck et al. (2013) . Supporting this theory, argue that this appears particularly plausible for SIFIs that have incentives to increase risk taking. Therefore, we hypothesise that CONCENTRATION has the effect of increasing systemic risk.
To control for the country's indebtedness we use the government debt ratio (DEBT), which is the government gross debt in relation to the respective gross domestic product (GDP). Policy makers in countries with high levels of debt have lower chances to bail out banks since financial resources are scarce. We therefore expect high government debt ratio levels to increase domestic banks' systemic risk. Finally, to capture the influence of inter-relations between a country and its domestic banking sector, we use the claims of the institutions on their respective central government (as a percentage of GDP) as another variable (BANK_CL).
If the domestic banking sector holds a relatively high share of its government's public debt, this should increase the systemic risk of banks in the financial system. Table 4 provides univariate statistics for all country and regulatory controls of our panel regressions. Further information on the evolution of all variables is reported in Appendix Table 5 . 
Results
In this section, we first present the results for the estimates of banks' systemic risk, and then turn to the panel regressions of the dependent systemic risk measure for our sample of 334 bank observations during 2007 and 2012.
Systemic risk of European banks
We first compute the SRI for all banks in the sample. The distribution results (see Table 5) demonstrate that, possibly due to monetary and supervisory interventions, median values of is increasing, possibly due to the increasing alertness of banks' stockholders.
The statistics on SRI demonstrate that the highest systemic risk levels can be observed for the period during the Eurozone crisis from 2010 to 2012. Looking at the standard deviation (Std.dev.) and the Min/Max values, we also find evidence that there is an increasing inequality among banks with respect to systemic risk, i.e. some are becoming less systemically relevant while others are becoming more systemically relevant. We provide the names of the top 5 banks in the sample in the systemic risk ranking for each year in Appendix Table 7 . 
Determinants of systemic risk
Turning to our main research question, we try to identify the drivers of systemic risk for our sample of European banks. To this end, we estimate several linear panel regression models using SRI and its components SRC and SRS as the dependent variables as well as our bankspecific and country-/policy-specific explanatory variables: Table 6 presents the results of our main regressions for the full period of 334 bank observations, while results of numerous robustness checks and panel data tests/diagnostics are reported in the appendix.
The random effects estimator is used to account for time-invariant bank-specific influences, and guarantees consistent coefficient estimates. However, the Hausmann (1978) specification test indicates that the random effects estimator is only consistent for the baseline regression (Appendix Table 2 ). Therefore, we use the fixed effects estimator model for the other panel regressions. The assumption behind the fixed effects model is that, unlike the random effects model, variation across entities is neither random nor uncorrelated with the predictor or independent variables included in the model. All estimation results of the linear panel regression models are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent Huber-White (1980) standard errors because unreported results confirm the presence of heteroskedasticity in our regressions.
Further results of various test diagnostics (random effects, fixed effects, cross sectional dependence, autocorrelation) are reported in Appendix Table 2 .
The panel regression models in Table 6 present the interesting result that numerous explanatory variables have a significant effect on systemic risk as measured by the SRC, SRS, and SRI. Most resulting significant coefficients, however, match closely with our estimated direction of influence.
To start with SIZE, the coefficient indicates that bank size is significant for SRI: The larger banks are, the larger the probability that they infect others should they get into financial problems. Analogously observed from a macroeconomic view, a system is more vulnerable if it relies to a large extent on a small number of larger banks, as it makes them being rescued or replaced by a competitor more unlikely. We confirm the findings of Haq and Heaney (2012), Black et al. (2013) , and Varotto and Zhao (2014) for European banks. For SRC as the dependent variable, however, we find that the largest European banks did not increase systemic risks, but had a calming effect on the system. This may be due to their implicit "too big to fail" insurance. In this case, regulation of banks' size may simply be counterproductive in mitigating systemic risks.
The proxy for the asset structure -loan ratio (LOAN) -and the proxy for income structurenon-interest income (NON_INT) -show a clear positive relation to systemic risk. Hence, the result for LOAN indicates that high volumes of loans can be a signal for deficits in risk diversification and increase the systemic risk of banks, while NON_INT (indicating a positive correlation of non-interest income business and systemic risk) indicates that the "bright side of innovation" (Beck et al., 2013 ) cannot be observed for European banks during the sample period. Our results for the non-performing loan (NON_PERF), leverage (LEVERAGE), and deposit ratio (DEPOSIT), however, show only insignificant coefficients. In particular, the insignificance of LEVERAGE is interesting. Regulators include this measure in Basel III, whereas we cannot empirically support an enhancing influence on systemic risk. The coefficient of TIER1 has a significantly positive impact on the SRS and the SRI. It means that for European banks, our counterintuitive finding -that high regulatory capital ratios drive systemic risk -confirms theoretical and empirical literature on regulatory disincentives, as explained in Section 4.2 (Perotti et al., 2011; Black et al., 2013) . Furthermore, most coefficients demonstrate consistent and equal signs within the three observed systemic risk measures. For example, LIQUIDITY demonstrates consistently positive coefficients whereas the cash flow-based FIN_POW has negative coefficients in all regression models (see Table   6 ). Both liquidity-related measures indicate different influences: The first means that liquidity of banks would increase systemic risks -an outcome that literature and theory do not support.
One explanation could be that a higher pool of cash indicates a lower profitability due to lessefficient allocation of capital. The negative impact of FIN_POW on systemic risk is more reasonable, as solvent banks are able to endow sufficient capital and current asset reserves, i.e.
cushions against losses or liquidity shortages, making them resistant against financial distortions.
The significant coefficients for the ratio of operating income to net sales (OP_MARG) and the return on invested capital (ROIC) provide very interesting results, illustrating both a riskenhancing and a risk-reducing effect of profitability: In the short run, banks may successfully engage in risky lending/non-lending activities. This high profitability would shield from the risk of defaulting, and lower systemic risk. In the long run, however, risk exposure may prove to be the other side of the profitability-coin. The annual growth of bank income (INCOME)
does not have a clear significant influence on systemic risk and, therefore, basically confirms our hypotheses from theory and empirical literature. Our results also support the positive correlation of systemic risk and MBR with significant results for SRS -and thus support the results of Brunnermeier et al. (2011), Varotto and Zhao (2014) , as well as Weiß et al. (2014) .
Our proxy for bank creditworthiness (LTR) shows significant, though contrary impacts of financial creditworthiness on systemic risk. A high LTR measure denotes a low creditworthiness. Therefore, the result suggests that banks with better/higher ratings have a higher SRC, but that their SRI is lower.
Our country controls are insightful too: The measure for political stability of a country (POLITIC_STAB) demonstrates an influence that is different from what the literature proposes and from what we would expect: Political stability and the absence of violence significantly increase the systemic risk of European banks. One possible explanation is that in a stable system actors found, operate, and interconnect financial institutions beyond the level that the institutional framework reliably provides. This is in contrast to political instability, in which links between financial units may disappear and, as a result (and somewhat paradoxically), reduce the systemic risk and the possibility of contagion.
REGULATION, capturing the World Bank's assessment of ability of a government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations, seems to exert significant influence on systemic risk for all periods. For both the SRI and the SRS, we find a negative correlation to systemic risk, i.e. that banks headquartered in countries that promote sound policies and private system development have less systemic risk. For the SRC, however, we see an inverse relationship of regulation and systemic risk that could stem from reactions to blind actiontaking national regulators. One outcome that we did not expect is the significant negative correlation of government debt ratio (DEBT) and systemic risk. We explain this with the high government debt ratios in western European countries with the most stable and bestdeveloped financial markets, i.e. in countries with such institutional frameworks, higher debt ratios are not inducing a higher systemic risk of banks. Finally, BANK_CL (the banks' claims against national governments) demonstrates a significant positive influence on the systemic risk index. We also provide evidence that this is especially the case for banks' SRS. Large government bond/loan exposures of banks indicate the strong interconnectedness of the financial and governmental systems, making the transfer of (financial) problems between them more likely. A higher volume of those assets can also be interpreted as a particular diversification failure, as the government is already a source of political/regulatory/legal risk, and now adds credit and market price risk.
Robustness checks
We perform numerous checks to examine the robustness of our results to alternate model specifications and different data (e.g. explanatory variables and the equity index as a proxy for the financial system). 17 Robustness check specification I (Appendix Table 3 ) provides results for the fixed effects regression of the full (unbalanced and balanced) sample. We can assume that the results of the baseline regressions depend neither on insignificant explanatory variables nor on the unbalanced nature of our panel data, nor on the choice of a fixed or random panel regression model. Robustness check specification II (Appendix Table 4) provides results for the baseline regressions (Table 6 ) using another bank equity index (EU Datastream Banks Index) as a proxy for the financial system. This supports the assumption that our results do not depend on the bank equity index we chose. Additionally, we estimate alternative specifications of the panel regressions using different sets of explanatory variables.
We find that the results from our baseline regressions are not substantially affected. To conclude, our robustness checks generally suggest that the findings obtained in the baseline specifications are robust.
Conclusion
In this study, we analyse the major drivers for systemic risk of banks in Europe. In particular, we identify why some banks are expected to contribute more to systemic events in the European financial system than others. In our panel regressions, we find empirical evidence supporting existing literature on systemically important financial institutions, identifying bank size, asset and income structure, loss and liquidity coverage, profitability, and several macroeconomic conditions as drivers of systemic risk. We also find that simple approaches in measuring systemic risk -as proposed by Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013) -would not be suitable because systemic risk contribution may be driven by different factors than systemic risk sensitivity.
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The regression diagnostics for the robustness checks are not reported in order to save space, but are available upon request.
Regulators have to consider a broad variety of indicators for assessing systemic risks.
Although we propose different measures for systemic risk, we empirically support the urgency of recent regulatory approaches to identify systemically important banks in Europe by using a broad set of financial indicators (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2013).
Macroprudential regulation is essential to prevent systemic risk crises in the banking system.
We provide evidence that existing microprudential-oriented rules for liquidity, liable equity capital, and leverage are less effective, and that policymakers may consider new measures like asset diversification to mitigate systemic risks in the banking system.
However, some limitations of our research remain: Even though our systemic risk measures avoid the shortcomings of existing approaches, the assessment of the tail co-movement of security prices excludes a number of (admittedly, "smaller") institutions without publicly listed securities. 18 The second shortfall is that we do not assess the systemic impact of other financial institutions, such as insurers, investment funds, and players from the growing shadow banking system. Finally, to confirm our findings in the long run, future research could try to make use of financial and country data over longer periods.
18
The most useful measures of systemic risk may be ones that have yet to be tried because they require proprietary data only regulators can obtain, see Bisias et al. (2012) . 
Appendix
LTR
LT Issuer Ratings are opinions of the ability of entities to honour senior unsecured financial obligations and contracts.
As our primary source we use Moody's long-term issuer ratings (or, alternatively, the long-term deposit ratings). In case of neither being existent, we take S&P's long-term issuer (foreign currency) ratings for banks or, alternatively, Fitch's long term issuer ratings as a last resort. Higher values indicate a higher default probability, i.e. a lower rating.
Rating history online database (Moody's, S&P's, Fitch); annual report, investor relations website (in case of missing data)
The table provides definitions and data sources for the variables that are used in the panel regressions.
Appendix The table provides the number of banks in the sample selected for each country. We additionally report the evolution of the mean values of the variables used in our empirical investigation. Variable definitions and sources are provided in Appendix Table 1 .
The table reports the two systemic risk measures we use to construct the systemic risk index: SRS and SRC. 
